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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A large number of various types of terrorist
organisations have an active presence in the EU.
Some of them aim at Member States or Third
State targets situated in Member States, whereas
some others who conduct their campaigns
mainly outside the EU, use the EU as their logis-
tical base or for fundraising.
Altogether 498 attacks were carried out in the
EU in 2006.The vast majority of them resulted in
limited material damage and were not intended
to kill. However, the failed attack in Germany
and the foiled London plot demonstrate that
Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.
A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism
offences were arrested in 15 Member States in
2006. Investigations into Islamist terrorism are
clearly a priority for Member States’ law enforce-
ment as demonstrated by the number of arrested
suspects reported by Member States.
The small number of suspects arrested for dis-
semination of propaganda may indicate the lack
of legal basis and difficulty in investigating
these types of crimes.
France, Spain and the UK are the countries most
severely affected by terrorism as concluded
from the number of terrorist attacks and arrested
suspects as well as the average penalties handed
out by the courts.
Islamist Terrorism
Along with the failed terrorist attack that took
place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each
reported one attempted terrorist attack in
2006. No further information on prevented or
disrupted Islamist terrorist attacks was made
available by the Member States’ law enforce-
ment authorities.
The London airplane plot and the trolley bomb
case of Germany targeted civilians and trans-
portation infrastructure in Member States. The
radicalisation process of the suspects in these
cases is reported to have been rapid.
The weapon of choice of Islamist terrorists are
Improvised Explosive Devices made with home-
made explosives. The cases reported by the UK
and Denmark involved the use of Triacetone
Triperoxide (TATP), a highly volatile explosive
the use of which requires a certain degree of
expertise.
Half of all the terrorism arrests were related to
Islamist terrorism. France, Spain, Italy and the
Netherlands had the highest number of arrests
of Islamist terrorist suspects. The majority of the
arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia and had loose affiliations to North
African terrorist groups, such as the Moroccan
Islamic Combatant Group and the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat.
However, the suspects involved in the foiled
plots reported by the UK and Denmark were
born or raised in a Member State. Converts, who
had been radicalised in Europe, were involved in
both cases.
The frequency of video statements by members
of the original al-Qaeda leadership and other
Islamist terrorists shows a marked increase. The
propaganda is of greater sophistication, of high
quality and more professional. English is used
more often, either in direct speech or in subtitles,
allowing potential access to a wider audience
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than previous publications in Arabic. These
facts may point to a coordinated global media
offensive from Islamist terrorists.
Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist
Terrorism
In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424
attacks in the EU. The Member States most
affected were France – with 60 percent of the
attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most
part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.
Five attacks took place in the UK and one in
Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for
these attacks.
After the unilateral cease fire declared in March
2006, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) mainly used
Taldes Y to carry out a high number of low inten-
sity attacks to maintain pressure on the Spanish
government and to demonstrate to its supporters
its determination to fight for its goals. However,
the attack at the Madrid airport on 30 December
2006 by ETA resulted in casualties and injuries.
ETA has not only maintained but also rebuilt its
capabilities to strike with well-prepared, organ-
ised and coordinated attacks against high pro-
file targets.
Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a
very high number of low intensity attacks
resulting mainly in limited material damage.
Only six percent of the attacks were committed
against governmental targets. Although Cor-
sican separatists have not directly tried to kill
people, the volume of attacks may increase the
risk of casualties.
The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in
the EU is related to the escalation of the terrorist
campaign of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey.
Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism 
In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried
out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns mainly
targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany.
Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out a
relatively high number of low-intensity attacks
which resulted in limited material damage
against business and governmental targets. A
minority of the attacks, however, were intended
to kill or injure.
A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist
groups are active mostly in Germany, Greece, Italy
and Spain. In Greece, the number of terrorist
attacks rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are
motivated by domestic politics but they are also
perpetrated as a part of wider international
campaigns; for instance, the G8 Summit 2007
that still has to be held has already been the
target of left-wing and anarchist terrorists.
Right-Wing Terrorism
Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as
right-wing extremism and not as right-wing
terrorism.
Although violent acts perpetrated by right-wing
extremists and terrorists may appear sporadic
and situational, right-wing extremist activities
are organised and transnational. For instance,
details regarding possible targets are collected
and disseminated on the Internet.
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1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR
The TE-SAT 2007 is the
fifth edition of the EU
Terrorism Situation and
Trend Report. However,
this edition is the very
first ‘Europol TE-SAT’, as it
is the first TE-SAT pro-
duced after the Council
of the European Union
delegated to Europol the
power to approve the
final version of the report. After the EU Organi-
sed Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), this is the
second major public awareness product for
which Europol assumes full responsibility. This
formal change was accompanied by a methodo-
logical reorientation. In the beginning of 2006,
Europol proposed to widen the data collection
for the TE-SAT in order to enhance the quality of
the report and to make it a better awareness
tool for decision makers.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the EU.
Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century, the
threat posed by terrorism to Member States is
more serious than ever. The attacks in Madrid in
2004 and in London in 2005 resulted in mass
casualties, and the failed bomb attacks in
Germany, together with a considerable number
of plots disrupted in 2006, are a strong reminder
that this threat prevails.
Virtually all terrorist activities are transnational.
Therefore, counter-terrorism in the EU is a matter
of solidarity. As stated on many different occa-
sions in the past, effective counter-terrorism in
the EU requires increased information exchange,
cooperation and coordination between Member
States’ competent authorities. In addition to
this, we need to have a common assessment of
the situation to be able to counter terrorism in a
joint effort and to find more effective responses.
The challenge in understanding terrorism as a
phenomenon is not the lack of information, but
rather the huge amount and varying quality of
information publicly available. The TE-SAT
2007 provides an overview of the phenome-
non of terrorism in the EU from the law
enforcement perspective. We believe that this
approach provides a solid basis for decision
making, since terrorism inevitably involves the
commission of violent crimes and other crimi-
nal activities. Consequently, the investigation,
trial and punishment of the perpetrators and
their accomplices, irrespective of their motive,
are clearly a matter for the criminal justice sys-
tem. The TE-SAT 2007 establishes the basic
facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU
based on the Member States’ reporting on crimi-
nal investigations into terrorism and the prose-
cution and convictions for terrorist offences.
The methodology of the TE-SAT 2007 was
developed in consultation with the Finnish and
German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN.
Europol is grateful to their support and valuable
contribution. I would also like to thank the Mem-
ber States and Eurojust for the quantity and the
quality of the data provided to Europol for the
TE-SAT 2007.
Max-Peter Ratzel
Director of Europol
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2. INTRODUCTION
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
(TE-SAT) was established as a reporting mecha-
nism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to
the European Parliament in the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks in 2001. Four editions of the TE-SAT
have been presented to date by the
Presidencies “based on a file and on the analyses
supplied by Europol” from Member States’ con-
tributions.1
In the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to
widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order
to enhance the quality of the report. The pro-
posal was endorsed by the Justice and Home
Affairs Council on 1 and 2 June 2006. This TE-SAT
follows the new methodology developed by
Europol in consultation with the Finnish and
German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN.
According to ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the
TE-SAT is an unclassified annual document
which provides information on the phenome-
non of terrorism in the EU. The phenomenon of
terrorism is discussed in the TE-SAT 2007 from
the law enforcement point of view as a ‘crime’
although, admittedly, terrorism is fundamentally
a political phenomenon driven by political
motives and oriented toward political ends.
As an analytical report, the TE-SAT is a situation
report. It describes the outward manifestations
of terrorism i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It
neither attempts to analyse the root causes of
terrorism nor to assess the threat posed by ter-
rorism. Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess
the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism
policies and law enforcement measures taken,
despite the fact that they form an important
part of the phenomenon.
The TE-SAT 2007 is an EU report and as such
aims at providing an overview of the situation in
the EU instead of describing the situation in sin-
gle Member States as was the case in earlier edi-
tions of the TE-SAT. It seeks to establish basic
facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks and
activities in the EU.
The TE-SAT is, however, also a trend report. Since
a trend can be defined as “a general tendency in
the way a situation is changing or developing”,
the TE-SAT is a forward-looking report, which is
why the first issue of the Europol TE-SAT is called
TE-SAT 2007. However, due to changes in the
methodology, it is difficult to compare the find-
ings of the TE-SAT 2007 to earlier editions of the
TE-SAT and establish trends.
The TE-SAT is based mainly on information con-
tributed by the Member States concerning and
resulting from criminal investigations into ter-
rorism offences. The TE-SAT does not contain
information which is classified or which could
jeopardise ongoing investigations.
TE-SAT
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3. TE-SAT 2007 METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Definitions
Terrorism
Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a
tactic or a method for attaining political goals.
This view is also reflected in the Council
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on
Combating Terrorism (2002/275/JHA)2. All
Member States had to align their national legis-
lation with this Framework Decision by 31
December 2002. According to the EU Action
Plan on Combating Terrorism of 13 February
2006, most Member States apart from Slovakia,
Austria, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have
adapted their national legislation. New legisla-
tive procedures are in preparation for in all four
Member States.3
Before the adoption of the Framework Decision,
seven Member States had specific legislation in
the field of counterterrorism, namely France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the
United Kingdom. In the other countries, ordi-
nary criminal law was used to prosecute these
types of crimes.4 The legal situation with regard
to the implementation of the Framework
Decision in the eight Member States which pro-
vided information on convictions to Eurojust is
described in Annex 3.
Even if Member States approximated their
national legislation fully in this respect, Article
1 of the Framework Decision includes subjec-
tive elements such as the impact of the act
concerned, which are open to interpretation.
For practical reasons, the data collected for
the TE-SAT 2007 relies on Member States’
definitions of terrorist offences.
The TE-SAT 2007 focuses on terrorism only.
Extremism as a phenomenon may be related to
terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural pat-
terns. Although all terrorists are extremists, not
all extremists are terrorists. Extremism does not
necessarily include the use of violence with the
intention of, for instance, seriously destabilise or
destroy the fundamental political, constitution-
al, economic or social structures of a country as
required for a terrorist offence under Member
States’ national laws. Politically motivated vio-
lent acts and other crimes committed, for
instance, by right-wing or animal rights extrem-
ists are thus not included in the TE-SAT data col-
lection unless reported as terrorist activities by
Member States.
Types of Terrorism
Most statistical reports on terrorism make a dis-
tinction between international and domestic
terrorism. International or transnational terror-
ism refers to terrorist activities in more than one
country, while domestic terrorism is confined
within the borders of one country, sometimes
within a particular locality in the country.5 In
addressing domestic terrorism, a country can be
self-reliant if it possesses sufficient resources,
whereas in the case of transnational terrorism,
9
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3 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
4 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
5 See Wilkinson, Paul (2000) Terrorism versus Democracy. The Liberal State Response, p. 19.
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countries’ counter-terrorism policies are interde-
pendent. Since it was not always possible to
determine whether terrorist attacks or activities
were transnational or domestic from the basis of
the reported cases, it was decided not to use this
typology in this report. It should be noted that
almost all terrorist campaigns are transnational;
terrorists may seek inspiration and resources –
financing, weapons and expertise – where avail-
able, also outside their own geographical area of
influence.
Types of terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are
categorised by their source of motivation.This is,
however, not an easy task as many groups have
a mixture of motivating ideologies, although
usually one ideology or motivation dominates.
The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT is
pragmatic and reflects the current situation in
the EU. The categories are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive.
Islamist terrorism is motivated either in whole
or in part by an extreme interpretation of Islam
and the use of violence is regarded by its practi-
tioners as a divine duty or sacramental act.6 
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist
groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and
the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which renamed
itself Kongra-Gel in 2003, seek international
recognition and political self-determination.
They are usually motivated by nationalism, eth-
nicity and religion.
Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C),
seek to change the entire political social and
economic system to an extreme left model and
their ideology is often revolutionary Marxist-
Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist
groups, such as the Unofficial Anarchist Fede-
ration (Federazione Anarchica Informale, FAI), is
usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and antiau-
thoritarian. For practical reasons, the activities
of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are
discussed in the same chapter of this report.
Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change
the entire political social and economic system
to an extreme right model. The ideological roots
of European right-wing terrorism can usually be
traced back to National Socialism.7
3.2. TE-SAT 2007 Data 
The data collection for the TE-SAT covered ter-
rorist attacks and activities in the EU and terror-
ist attacks outside the EU, in which EU interests
were affected. In addition, Eurojust collected
data on prosecutions and convictions for terror-
ist offences in Member States.
The data collection of terrorist attacks impac-
ting on EU interests outside the EU was not
comprehensive. The distinction between at-
tacks related to insurgency, terrorism and even
organised crime is becoming increasingly
blurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore
and as an example, some EU-based internation-
al companies are being targeted more or less
regularly in certain regions. Since it was not
always possible to verify the motivation of
these attacks, they were not included in the
data collected by Europol unless clearly perpe-
trated by terrorists.
Because of the change in the reporting period,
the data collection covered not only 2006, but
also the period of October-December 2005.
Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on
terrorist attacks and activities as well as on
arrested suspects from reports on terrorist inci-
dents contributed by the Member States. As
requested by Belgium, Belgian data originates
mainly from the Monthly Bulletins of the Federal
Police. The processed data was cross-checked
and, in case of gaps, complemented by open
source data.
• The data regarding terrorist attacks was
cross-checked with the RAND Incident
Database8 as made available by the MIPT
Terrorism Knowledge Base (see for more
information www.tkb.org).
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6 Compare to Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, pp. 83 and 89-97.
7 Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See
Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, p. 237.
8 The RAND Incident Database is regarded as one of the best resources in the world and is widely used in ter-
rorism research.
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• The data regarding terrorist activities and
arrested suspects was cross-checked with
open source data systematically monitored,
collected and processed by Europol’s
Counter-Terrorism Unit.
After this, Europol requested Member States to
validate their own national data.
Thirteen Member States also provided Europol
with qualitative data on terrorist attacks and
activities.
Eurojust collected data based on the Council
Decision on the Exchange of Information and
Cooperation Concerning Terrorist Offences
(2005/671/JHA)9, according to which Member
States are obliged to collect all relevant informa-
tion concerning prosecutions and convictions
for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust. A
questionnaire was produced at the end of 2006
asking for details on convictions related to ter-
rorism including, among others, the crimes with
which the suspects were charged, the crimes for
which they were sentenced and the penalty
imposed.Twenty-three Member States respond-
ed to the questionnaire. Part of the national data
was collected at Eurojust through an analysis of
the court rulings.10
Eight Member States provided Eurojust with
information on cases in their national courts.
The UK provided information only on a small
number of high-profile cases. Luxemburg,
Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Austria,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, Malta,
Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia reported having
had no cases. Ireland reported having had
cases, but could provide no details as yet. No
response was received from Greece and Cyprus.
Although the data is not complete, Member
States mostly affected by terrorist offences pro-
vided their contribution.11
The abovementioned Council Decision also
obliges Member States to collect all relevant
information concerning and resulting from
criminal investigations conducted by their law
enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist
offences and send it to Europol. This informa-
tion facilitates Europol’s data collection for the
TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the TE-SAT
does not contain information that may jeopar-
dise ongoing investigations.
The collected data for October-December 2005
and for the year 2006 concerned a total of 549
attacks, 128 terrorist activities, 810 arrested sus-
pects and 303 trials in the EU. It should be noted
that the arrests and convictions were not neces-
sarily related to terrorist offences that took place
during the reporting period.
Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be
due to the fact that the investigations into the
terrorist attack or activities concerned are still
ongoing. It is also known that terrorist activities
are not always investigated as terrorist offences.
Furthermore, it seems likely that terrorist attacks
and activities with perceived low and/or local
impact are underreported to Europol. Since
only the ‘most spectacular’ cases – particularly
regarding terrorist activities – end up in the
media, it is impossible to track these investiga-
tions via open sources monitoring and include
them in the data.
As stated before, criminal investigations into
extremist activities were neither reported to nor
collected by Europol.
The level of detail in Member States’ reporting
on terrorist attacks, activities and arrests varied
from complete national statistics to general
descriptions of the situation. For instance, there
were instances where an attack was reported,
but not the number of casualties or fatalities, or
the number of suspects arrested in a major
operation was given, but no further details
regarding the age or nationality were made
available.
The data contributed to the TE-SAT by France
and Spain is very detailed and complete, but
the French data did not cover October-
December 2005. The UK was unable to give full
3.
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9 The deadline for the implementation was 30 June 2006.
10 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
11 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
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data due to legal restrictions. For instance, no
details regarding arrested suspects could be
made available as the UK does not provide sta-
tistics on cases that are awaiting trial.
The description and analysis of Islamist activities
on the Internet is mainly based on the data col-
lected by the monitoring of Islamists’ communi-
cation methods launched in October 2004
within the Counter-Terrorism Task Force.
Both quantitative and qualitative Member Sta-
tes’ data on terrorist attacks and activities was
collected. Terrorism is not mass or collective
violence but rather the direct activity of small
groups, however popular these groups may be.
Even if supported by a larger organisation, the
number of active militants who engage in ter-
rorism is usually small.12 However, some aspects
of the phenomenon such as attacks and arrest-
ed suspects can also be analysed with the use of
quantitative research methods. Due to the rela-
tively small number of investigations into terror-
ist activities reported by Member States, terror-
ist activities are analysed and described mainly
with the help of qualitative data although quan-
titative data was collected to support analytical
work.
3.
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12 Crenshaw, Martha (2003) Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts, p. 4. In Crenshaw, Martha (ed.)
Terrorism in Context.
4.1. Terrorist Attacks
Eleven Member States were targeted by 498
terrorist attacks in 2006. During October-
December 2005, 51 terrorist attacks were car-
ried out in the EU. Despite the high number of
terrorist attacks, the vast majority of them
resulted only in material damage and were not
intended to kill.
There were no successful Islamist terrorist
attacks in the EU in 2006. However, a coordinat-
ed but ultimately failed attack aimed at mass
casualties took place in Germany.
The vast majority of terrorist attacks were per-
petrated by separatist terrorist groups target-
ing France and Spain. In France, 283 attacks
took place in Corsica in 2006. In Spain, despite
the truce declared by ETA in March 2006, sepa-
ratist groups perpetrated 136 attacks, mainly in
the Basque region. Only the attack at the Mad-
rid airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in
casualties.
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups cam-
paigned mostly in Greece, Italy, Spain and
Germany. None of the attacks resulted in casu-
alties, but some of them were intended to kill.
Despite Member States’ reports on incidents
involving extreme right-wing violence, only one
incident was reported as a terrorist attack in
2006.
The Member States reported criminal inves-
tigations into 59 different terrorist groups.
Of these, nine were on the EU list of terrorist
4. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU 
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Member State Islamist Separatist Left-Wing Right-Wing
Other/Not
Specified
Total 
Austria 0 0 0 0 1 1
Belgium 0 0 0 0 1 1
France 0 283 0 0 11 294
Germany 1 0 10 0 2 13
Greece 0 0 25 0 0 25
Ireland 0 1 0 0 0 1
Italy 0 0 11 0 0 11
Poland 0 0 0 1 0 1
Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 1
Spain 0 136 8 0 1 145
UK 0 4 0 0 1 5
Total 1 424 55 1 17 498
FIGURE 1: Terrorist Attacks in 2006 by Type of Terrorism
organisations.13 One third of the terrorist orga-
nisations investigated also conduct campaigns
outside the EU.
4.2. Arrested Suspects
A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism
offences were arrested in 15 Member States in
2006.
Despite the small number of Islamist terrorist
attacks in the EU, half of the arrests carried out
were related to Islamist terrorism (figure 2).
France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands had the
highest number of arrests of Islamist terrorist
suspects.14
A high number of people – 188 – were arrested
in France suspected of separatism. Sixty percent
of them were related to investigations into ter-
rorist attacks.
Only seven percent of the arrests were related to
left-wing and anarchist terrorism, a fact which
may indicate that these groups are not perceived
as a major threat and a priority by Member
States’ law enforcement for the time being.
Thirty-two percent of the arrested individuals
(N=550)15 were suspected of either prepara-
tion of or involvement in a terrorist attack (fi-
gure 1). Forty-one percent of the arrested indi-
viduals (N=550) were suspected of being
members of a terrorist organisation. Half of
them were linked to a terrorist organisation
that could be specified. Only five of these or-
ganisations were on the EU list of terrorist
organisations.
TE-SAT
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13 Council Common Position 2006/231/CFSP of 20 March 2006 Updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on
the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism and Repealing Common Position 2005/936/CFSP.
14 Based on open sources reporting, it seems that the number of arrests made in relation to Islamist terrorism
in the UK is among the highest in the EU.
15 UK arrests are excluded as no details were made available.
Member State Islamist Separatist Left-Wing Right-Wing Total
Austria 0 1 0 0 1
Belgium 1 0 1 12 14
Denmark 9 0 0 0 6
France 139 188 15 0 342
Germany 11 4 5 0 20
Ireland 0 4 0 0 4
Italy 34 0 25 0 59
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 1
The Netherlands 6 0 0 0 6
Poland 0 0 0 3 3
Slovakia 3 0 0 0 3
Spain 51 28 6 0 85
Sweden 3 0 0 0 3
UK _ _ _ _ 156
Total 257 226 52 15 706
FIGURE 2: Arrested Terrorism Suspects in 2006 by Type of Terrorism 
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Other most common suspected terrorist activities
included financing of terrorism and facilitation
such as falsification of documents, organisation
of travel and provision of safe houses. The small
amount of arrests related to the production
and dissemination of propaganda indicates the
lack of legal basis and the difficulty in investigat-
ing this type of cases as, on many occasions, the
suspected criminal activities take place on the
Internet.
Almost half of the arrested suspects were EU
citizens (figure 4). It should be noted that in
seventeen percent of the cases the nationality
of the suspect was not reported. 70 percent of
female suspects were EU citizens. Almost all
suspects coming from outside the EU were
men.
The age of the arrested suspects ranged
between 17 and 76. The average age is 36 years.
However, two thirds of them were aged bet-
ween 26 and 46. Approximately 75 percent of
the suspects who were younger than 30 or older
than 51 were EU citizens.
4.3. Convictions and Penalties
Three hundred and three persons were tried in
relation to terrorism for the period from 1 Oc-
tober 2005 until 31 December 2006, as notified
to Eurojust by eight Member States (figure 5).16
Furthermore, 136 court proceedings were
reported for the period concerned. No informa-
tion was provided regarding the date when the
crime was committed and the time that had
elapsed between arrest, trial and date of convic-
tion. Generally, it can be stated that the convic-
tions mainly relate to events which occurred
before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2007. 17
The total of 46 acquittals is to be viewed in rela-
tion to the total of 303 persons tried in the rele-
vant timeframe (figure 6).18 The percentage of
acquittals is relatively high in the Netherlands,
where six of the 21 persons tried were acquitted.
This may be seen in relation to the fact that, for
the first time ever, the Dutch prosecution
authorities prosecuted two groups – of 14 and
six individuals, respectively – in two separate
proceedings on the charge of membership of
a criminal and terrorist organisation and on the
charge of preparing for an armed attack and
recruiting for the jihad. Not all members of the
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16 The UK provided an overview of high profile cases and not the total number of cases.
17 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
18 Information on appeals pending is not always available, so these convictions and acquittals may not yet be
final.
Gender EU NEU Unknown Total
Female 71 16 13 100
Male 51 35 14 100
Unknown 4 8 88 100
Total 52 31 17 100
FIGURE 4: Nationalities of Arrested Suspects by
Gender
Member State 2005 2006 Total
Belgium 0 24 24
France 0 21 21
Germany 0 16 16
Italy 7 0 7
Spain 51 154 205
Sweden 2 3 5
The Netherlands 1 20 21
UK 1 3 4
Total 63 240 303
FIGURE 5: Individuals Tried for Terrorism Charges
Not Specified
5%
Preparation
Attack/Attack
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FIGURE 3: Involvement of Arrested Suspects in
Various Terrorist Activities
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group were found to have had the same level of
participation. Appeals are currently pending in
both proceedings. Additionally, it may be noted
that, at the time of writing, the Dutch Supreme
Court had also ordered a re-trial for the single
acquittal which took place at the end of 2005. 19
Member States reported a number of legal chal-
lenges which were commonly encountered in
these types of trials and may have had an effect
on the acquittals, such as:
• a lack of capacity at both investigation and
prosecution stage to deal with the often
huge amount of paper and electronic evi-
dence;
• the high cost of translation services and the
amount of time required for the translation
and analysis of the evidence;
• the duration of pre-trial detention is strictly
limited, often not offering enough time in
these complicated cases;
• the cost and time demands of the travel and
cooperation required by the cross-border
nature of the crime;
• the amount of time required for the execu-
tion of letters rogatory ; and
• the possibility to use intelligence informa-
tion in court.20
Figure 7 provides an overview of the average
penalty per convicted individual given in the
eight Member States. A note of caution howev-
er is needed for the detention period in Spain,
where there were a total of 172 convictions dur-
ing the relevant time frame. These individuals
received a total sentence of 8,236 years in
prison, due to the fact that a few individuals
received a sentence of several hundreds of years
and some even more than a thousand years.
Eurojust modified any sentence higher than 40
years to 40 years in order to be able to calculate
the average in all countries.
In the cases of suspended sentences – e.g. four
years of which three years suspended – the time
of imprisonment was calculated as four years.
The high average of penalties in Spain can be
explained by the fact that out of 172 convic-
tions, 33 convictions were given for murder or
for collateral fatalities. The number of sentences
for terrorist attacks causing vast damage and
injuries was high in Spain. In comparison, the
German courts handed out a sentence of 15
years to an individual both for assisting to mur-
der in 246 cases and for membership of a terror-
ist organisation. This particular case was con-
nected to the 9/11 attacks. In the UK, sentences
were also relatively high, considering that for
instance one individual received a life sentence
with a minimum term fixed at 40 years for con-
spiracy to murder (plans to bomb building in
the US and elsewhere).
In France, no convictions were given for killings
in October-December 2005 and in the year 2006,
but high sentences were given for conspiracy to
prepare a terrorist activity in conjunction with
other charges. One person was convicted as
charged for 20 years; five others for 17 years.
In the Netherlands, the highest conviction in the
relevant time frame was for 15 years for the
crimes of ‘membership of a criminal organisa-
tion (with the aim to spread hatred and incite-
ment) and membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion (with the aim to threaten with a terrorist
crime)’. The murderer of the Dutch film maker
Theo Van Gogh was also convicted again in 2006
4.
OV
ER
VI
EW
 O
F 
TH
E 
SI
TU
AT
IO
N 
IN
 T
HE
 E
U
19 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
20 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
Member 
State Convicted Acquitted
%
Acquitted
Belgium 18 6 25
France 21 0 0
Germany 16 0 0
Italy 7 0 0
Spain 172 33 16
Sweden 4 1 20
The Netherlands 15 6 29
UK 4 0 0
Total 257 46 15
FIGURE 6: Individuals Convicted and Percentage
of Acquittals 
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for the same charges as above, but no addition-
al sentence was given to his previous life sen-
tence for the murder.
4.4. General Findings and Trends
• A large number of various types of terrorist
organisations have an active presence in
the EU. Some of them target Member
States or Third State interests in Member
States, whereas some others use the EU as
their logistical base or for fundraising and
conduct their campaigns mainly outside
the EU.
• Altogether 498 terrorist attacks were com-
mitted in the EU in 2006.The vast majority of
them resulted in limited material damage
and were not intended to kill. However, the
failed attack in Germany demonstrates that
Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.
• Investigations into Islamist terrorism are
clearly a priority for Member States’ law
enforcement as demonstrated by the num-
ber of arrested suspects reported by
Member States.
• One fifth of the arrested terrorism suspects
from the EU were women. Almost all arres-
ted terrorism suspects from outside the EU
were men.
• The small number of suspects arrested for
dissemination of propaganda may indicate
the lack of legal basis and difficulty in inves-
tigating these types of crimes.
• The number of acquittals may reflect legal
challenges Member States face in terrorism
trials such as a lack of capacity in both the
investigation and prosecution stage to deal
with the often huge amount of paper and elec-
tronic evidence, as well as the fact that the
cross-border nature of the crime requires cost-
ly and time-consuming travel and cooperation.
• France, Spain and the UK are the Member
States that are most severely affected by ter-
rorism as concluded from the number of ter-
rorist attacks and arrested suspects as well as
the average penalties.
• Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia and Slovenia seem to be the
Member States least affected by terrorism as
they reported neither criminal investigations
nor court proceedings related to terrorism
during October-December 2005 and the
year 2006.
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5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM
5.1. Terrorist Attacks
Along with the failed terrorist attack that took
place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each
reported one attempted terrorist attack. No fur-
ther information on prevented or disrupted
Islamist terrorist attacks was made available by
the Member States’ law enforcement authori-
ties.
German Trolley Bomb Case
On 31 July 2006, two Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) packed in two suitcases were
placed onboard two regional trains near
Cologne in an attempted coordinated attack.
The devices failed to detonate. Both so-called
‘trolley bombs’ were made up of a gas cylinder,
an alarm clock, a functioning detonator and
three PET bottles filled with petrol.21 Had the
devices detonated, it is estimated that there
would have been a significant loss of life in the
two trains.22
Two Lebanese nationals studying in Germany
were subsequently arrested on suspicion of
placing the IEDs on the trains.
The suspects were reported to have been moti-
vated by the publication of the Danish cartoons
of the Prophet Muhammad in German newspa-
pers; it was also reported that the Internet
played a role in preparations. Further, there
were reports that the suspects had undergone a
swift radicalisation process. The suspects initial-
ly intended to carry out the attack during the
FIFA World Cup but changed their plans due to
the security measures in place.23
UK Airplane Plot
On 10 August 2006, a series of arrests took place
in the UK in connection with an alleged suicide
bombing plot. The suspects planned to smuggle
TE-SAT
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21 Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
22 Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
23 Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
FIGURE 8: Arrested Suspects Related to Islamist
Terrorism in the EU
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the component parts of IEDs onto aircrafts and
assemble and detonate them on board and in
flight.24 Liquid explosives concealed in plastic
soft drink bottles were to be detonated with
battery powered detonators aboard trans-
Atlantic airliners en route from the UK to the US.
If successful, the attack would have caused mass
murder of potentially thousands of civilian air
travellers. The prevented attacks had a large
impact on civilian air travel with increased
restrictions on the amount of liquids allowed in
handheld cabin luggage.25
Eleven suspects were charged in connection
with the plot. The suspects were predominantly
UK citizens of Pakistani descent. They were
reportedly motivated to carry out the attack by
the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
intended to strike a target that would hit both
the UK and the US at the same time.26 They
seem to have undergone a ‘rapid radicalisation’:
in a matter of ‘some weeks and months, not
years’, they were prepared to kill civilians in a sui-
cide attack.27
Danish ‘Homegrown’ Vollsmose Group
On 5 September 2006, nine individuals were
arrested in Vollsmose, a suburb of Odense,
Denmark. Seven were remanded in custody on
suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack.
Allegedly, they procured material and effects for
making explosives.28 According to one account,
the explosives were produced using an
unknown quantity of ammonium nitrate and
Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) supplemented by
metal splinter shrapnel to increase the bombs’
destructive power.29
The Danish Minister of Justice stated that the
group had planned one or several terrorist
attacks against undisclosed targets within
Denmark.30 The motivation of the group
remains unknown. However, several commen-
tators have pointed to Denmark’s military
engagement in Iraq and the global row over
the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muham-
mad.
As in the UK case, the members of the Vollsmose
group were suspected of being so-called ‘home-
grown’ terrorists. More precisely, they were pre-
dominantly young second-generation Muslim
immigrants of Middle Eastern origin with Danish
citizenship. One member of the group was a
Danish convert to Islam.31
5.2. Arrested Suspects
During the period between October 2005 and
December 2006, a total of 340 persons were
reported as having been arrested on Islamist
terrorism related offences. Two hundred and
sixty arrests were carried out in 2006.32
Less than ten percent of the arrested individuals
were suspected of preparation, planning or exe-
cution of terrorist attacks. The arrests took place
in the Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
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24 ‘CPS Authorises Charges in Alleged Aircraft Terror Plot’, Crown Prosecution Service, 21 August 2006. The UK
Metropolitan Police stated to the public that searches had led to the seizure of bomb-making equipment
composed of chemicals, including hydrogen peroxide, electrical components, documents and other items;
see: ‘Terrorism Charges – Bulletin 0000000474’, Metropolitan Police Service, 21 August 2006.
25 See for example ‘Details Emerge in British Terror Case’, The New York Times, 28 August 2006.
26 Ibid.
27 Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair quoted in ‘UK Airline Bomb Suspects “Radicalised in Weeks”’,
Reuters, 24 January 2007.
28 Denmark’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007. ‘Statement Concerning Terror-Related Arrests’, Lars Findsen,
Director General of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET), 5 September 2006.
29 Taarnby Jensen, Michael (2006) Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in
Denmark 1990-2006, 48-49.
30 ‘Terrorplan var rettet mod Danmark’, Politiken, 5 September 2006.
31 Vidino, Lorenzo (2006) ‘The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia’. Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4,
Issue 20; and Taarnby Jensen, op. cit., 47-49.
32 156 terrorism suspects were arrested in the UK in 2006, but no further details regarding their motivation or
background were available. As can be concluded from open sources, a relatively high number of the indi-
viduals arrested in various operations in the UK in 2006 were suspected of Islamist terrorism related offences.
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The vast majority of the arrested individuals
were suspected of being members of a terrorist
organisation. Other frequent criminal activities
were financing of terrorism and facilitation.
Seven percent of the arrested individuals relat-
ed to Islamist terrorism were women. This figure
rises to 12 percent with regard to all arrested ter-
rorist suspects. Most women arrested in the
field of Islamist terrorism were suspected of
membership in a terrorist organisation and facil-
itation, for instance providing accommodation
and false documents. No female suspects were
arrested for planning, preparing or executing an
attack.
Seventy percent of the women arrested for
Islamist terrorism activities were EU citizens.
The bulk of the arrests took place in France,
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands and the majori-
ty of those arrested came from Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia. Arrested suspects originating from
North Africa were often loosely affiliated with
North African terrorist groups, such as the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe
salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, GSPC)
and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
(GICM).
More than two thirds of the arrested suspects
were aged between 26 and 41. The relatively
small number of young suspects may be part-
ly due to the fact that the data on arrested
suspects in the UK was not available as, for
instance, the majority of the nineteen individ-
uals arrested on 10 August 2006 in the con-
text of the alleged airplane plot were aged
between 22 and 25. One of the arrested was
as young as 17.33
Suspects in the age group between 30 and 41
years and those under 30 differ with respect to
the criminal activities of which they were sus-
pected. Membership of a terrorist organisation
represented fifty percent of the arrests in both
age groups. Activities such as financing of ter-
rorism or handling of false documents, on the
other hand, seemed to be more common
among the arrested suspects aged 30 to 41,
whereas younger suspects were more often
linked to recruitment and facilitation.
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33 ‘UK names 19 bomb plot suspects, freezes assets’, Reuters News, 11 August 2006.
FIGURE 9: Terrorist Activity per Age Group
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Furthermore, of those aged 30 to 41 years, seven
percent were arrested for executing or attempt-
ing to execute an attack, while only two percent
were arrested for planning or preparing an
attack. This pattern is reversed among those
under 30. A possible explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that younger suspects fail in the
execution of their plans or that law enforcement
authorities are more successful against this age
group.
5.3. Terrorist Activities
Propaganda
In October 2006, an Iraqi citizen was arrested in
Germany on suspicion of providing support to
foreign terrorist groups. He allegedly dissemi-
nated audio and video files showing leading
personalities of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia.34 In addition to this, in 2006 one
person was arrested in Denmark for Islamist ter-
rorist propaganda35 and two in the UK for solic-
iting murder by publishing inciting statements
and running websites inciting murder, urging to
fight jihad and raising funds, respectively.36 Law
enforcement agencies investigated propagan-
da offences in Belgium, Denmark, France and
Germany.37 The number of police investiga-
tions into this phenomenon seems small com-
pared to the amount of propaganda circulating
on the Internet. This is partly explained by the
lack of a legal basis for arrests of or investiga-
tion against persons using the Internet in this
manner. Law enforcement agencies also have
difficulties in identifying individuals who
spread Islamist terrorist propaganda on the
Internet. As an example, in autumn 2005, a sus-
pect arrested in the UK on charges of partici-
pating in an alleged bomb plot, turned out to
be a key individual that had used the Internet to
spread Islamist propaganda.38
Financing of Terrorism
Financing of terrorism covers two distinct
aspects: financing of terrorist attacks and fund-
ing of terrorist networks.
Relatively small sums are necessary to carry out
a terrorist attack; estimates for the Madrid
bombings in 2004 range from EUR 8,000 to
15,000. Given the small amount of money
required, the prevention of terrorist financing
appears to some extent unrealistic; hence prior-
ity is given to financial investigations into the
money trail left by terrorists.
Estimating the funds needed by terrorist organi-
sations to sustain their activities is difficult if not
impossible. An often quoted estimate places
al-Qaeda’s yearly expenditures aimed at sustaining
itself during the period preceding the 9/11 attacks
in 2001 at USD 30 million.39 There are no estima-
tes of al-Qaeda’s actual financial needs. There is lit-
tle doubt that money for funding Islamist terrorist
networks or organisations is gathered in the EU
through legal and/or illegal means. In this regard,
the fact that almost ten percent of all suspects
arrested in the EU during the reporting period
were involved in financial and material support
to terrorist organisations is significant. These sus-
pects are mostly linked to terrorist organisations,
such as the GSPC, the GICM, or al-Qaeda.
Financial and logistic support to terrorist organ-
isations is based on funds provided legally or
illegally by sympathisers of terrorist groups.
Funding is procured by establishing and manag-
ing small companies as sources of legal income,
which is then used to support radical groups
inside and outside the EU. Another very signifi-
cant source originates from private donations,
and from the misuse of zakat40 payments by
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34 Office of the Federal Attorney-General (Germany), press release no. 41 of 10 October 2006.
35 Denmark’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
36 The UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
37 Respective Member States’ contributions to TE-SAT 2007.
38 ‘Terrorist 007, Exposed’, Washington Post, 26 March 2006.
39 See 9/11 Commission Report and National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Monograph on Terrorism Financing, p. 9.
40 Zakat is the third pillar of Islam and refers to spending a fixed portion of one’s wealth for the poor or needy.
The basic minimum income over which an individual should pay zakat is known as nisab and is equivalent to
the value of 85 grams of gold (that is, app. EUR 1,400).
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Muslims. The funds are mostly collected by
charitable organisations or associations and
individuals.
No estimates are available about the amount of
money collected legally or illegally within the EU
which could be misused for terrorism funding.
There are strong suspicions that zakat money
collected within the EU is used to fund terrorism.
A UK-based charity reportedly remitted a large
amount of money declared to be relief funds for
earthquake victims to suspects in Pakistan who
were involved in the UK airplane plot.41 Funds
collected legally can be transferred worldwide
using the banking system without arousing sus-
picion; the fact that money has been misused
can not easily be established through legal
means; only post incident inquiries may allow to
follow the money trail.
The range of illegal sources for the funding of
terrorism appears to cover most criminal activi-
ties ranging from vehicle-related crimes to for-
gery of identity and travel documents or finan-
cial crimes, such as the use of false credit cards.42
Assessing the amount of illegal money used for
terrorism financing is also close to impossible.
Most of the profits generated, however, are in
cash and need to be transferred. Transfers via
the banking system and post office bank
accounts, the use of credit or debit cards,
cheques and travellers’cheques have been iden-
tified43; however, the most common means of
transfer of funds are cash couriers or cash trans-
fers via alternative remittance systems or via
legal cash transmittance channels such as
Western Union.
The detected transmitting systems are used in
two directions: from and to Europe. Funds are
collected in Member States and transmitted to
regions with a well-developed banking system
or to Middle Eastern countries. Money can then
be transferred to another destination or even be
sent back to Europe with the aim of concealing
the original link between the fundraiser and the
user of the funds.44
Recruitment 
Six Member States reported investigations into
Islamist terrorist recruitment in the EU between
October 2005 and December 2006.
In total, 24 individuals were arrested on suspi-
cion of terrorist recruitment45.
The individuals reported as having been arrest-
ed for recruitment were linked to the Iraqi Sunni
organisation Ansar al-Islam. This may suggest
that they were involved in recruiting volunteers
in the EU for the support of the armed struggle
against coalition troops in Iraq.
In most instances, the recruitment occurred in
schools, spiritual meeting places like mosques,
or in prisons.46 The modus operandi includes
the use of propaganda material such as videos,
tracts and movies supporting the claim that
Muslims must take part in the global jihad.47
Training
Eight persons were arrested in relation with ter-
rorist training. The charges included plotting to
establish a training camp, providing training and
receiving training in terrorist techniques.
All arrested suspects were men. No background
information was available concerning their age
or links to terrorist organisations.
In general, training in extremist ideology and
terrorist techniques takes place overseas, where
some of the terrorists receive military and spe-
cialist training.48 Nevertheless, one investiga-
tion concerned two training camps that were
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41 ‘Quake money used to finance UK plane bombing plot’, Daily Times, 12 August 2006.
42 Based on Portugal’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
43 Based on Italy’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
44 Based on Italy’s and the UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
45 This figure includes 3 arrests from 2005.
46 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
47 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
48 The UK’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
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allegedly established in the South of England. In
terrorist training camps, participants are taught
a very radical interpretation of Islam and
trained in handling explosives, as well as setting
up and financing terrorist cells. Trainers usually
belong to the militant categories of Islamists,
maintaining international contacts with other
members or networks.49
The camps are mainly located in the Middle or
Near East, or in South-East Asia. Training camps
in the Sahel region, mostly controlled by al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, seem to acquire increas-
ing importance and are used for the training of
several terrorists originating in the Maghreb.50
Individuals that receive terrorist training remain
in contact with both their facilitation networks
and support cells.51 Religious or paramilitary
training activities abroad might be an indicator
that terrorists are in the early planning phase of
an attack.52
Facilitation
In 2006, a total of 52 individuals were arrested in
seven Member States suspected of a wide range
of offences related to facilitation of or support
to terrorism. Two thirds of the suspected indi-
viduals were arrested in France and Spain.
Eighty-six percent of those arrested for facilita-
tion were men, mainly North African or EU
nationals.
In the reports contributed by the Member
States, facilitation covers a wide range of sup-
port activities: provision of false identity docu-
ments, resources and fundraising for terrorist
networks engaged in conflict areas.53 Other
supporters of terrorism provide false adminis-
trative documents, consultancy services or
assistance in marriages of convenience, in par-
ticular for illegal immigrants who adhere to
Islamist ideologies.54 Several cells or networks
dismantled in Spain and in Italy were found to
be supporting North African groups in Europe
and facilitating the dispatching of fighters to
Iraq.55 Only a few of the cases reported concern
the provision of false documentation for the
use by Islamists. However, it should be noted
that this offence is often considered a common
law crime when no link with Islamist terrorism
can be established.
5.4. Situation outside the EU
The perceived oppression of Islam or the pre-
sence of ‘foreign’ troops in Islamic lands is often
invoked as justification for the execution of ter-
rorist acts in several parts of the world, such as
Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq or Afghanistan.The idea
that these local struggles are part of a global
jihad, seen as a worldwide war between Islam
and the non-believers, has been actively pro-
moted by Islamist terrorist ideologues and lead-
ers of Islamist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda.
Whereas local insurgency or resistance groups
aim at overthrowing or seceding from the
affected state’s government, the ideology of
global jihad identifies the Western world, inclu-
ding the EU Member States, as the principle
enemy and target.
Currently, due to the presence there of Member
State military forces, the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan have the largest impact upon the
security environment of the EU. Aside from the
risk of terrorist attacks within Member States
aiming to apply pressure to withdraw their
troops, suicide attacks and bomb attacks with
IEDs have been perpetrated against officials,
contractors, journalists and aid workers in
Afghanistan and Iraq. While the majority of
Islamist terrorist attacks were committed in Iraq,
attacks in Afghanistan have increased sharply,
killing at least 3,600 persons in 2006. Further-
more, there were 117 suicide attacks, a previ-
ously unknown phenomenon in Afghanistan,
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49 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
50 Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (CGI).
51 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
52 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
53 The UK’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
54 Portugal’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
55 Italy’s and Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
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during the period under review, which caused
278 fatalities.56 Some of these attacks were
reportedly committed by non-Afghans.57
However, the percentage of suicide attacks in
Afghanistan is small in comparison to attacks
overall.
Other incidents in Afghanistan affecting
Member States include the murders of two
German journalists in October 2006, the kidnap-
ping of three French aid workers released in
September 2006, the kidnapping of an Italian
journalist released in November 2006 and the
increased targeting of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) exemplified by the killing
of local aid workers and the burning and looting
of CARE International, ACTED and OXFAM’s offices
in Kabul in June 2006.58
In North Africa, attacks against Western targets
took place in Egypt and Algeria. On 24 April
2006, the tourist resort of Dahab in the Sinai
Peninsula, Egypt, was targeted by a group using
the name of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Three
explosions killed 23 persons, including a
German national, and wounded more than 80,
including tourists from Denmark, France,
Germany and the UK.59 The Algerian GSPC took
responsibility for the bomb attack against a bus
transporting staff working for a US construction
company on 10 December 2006, in which two
people were killed and eight injured, among
them four UK nationals.60 Noteworthy North
African counter-terrorism (CT) operations took
place in Morocco, where 56 members of the
Islamist group calling itself Ansar al-Mahdi were
arrested in early autumn of 200661, and in
Tunisia, where security forces intercepted a
group of suspected GSPC-affiliated terrorists
coming from Algeria in December 2006.62
In East Africa, a number of Swedish nationals
fighting with the Union of Islamic Courts move-
ment in Somalia were reportedly killed, while
others were arrested.63
Amid worldwide protests against the publication
of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad
in a Danish newspaper (see below the chapter
on Islamist terrorist propaganda) in February
2006, a German national was briefly abducted in
the West Bank, while Palestinian gunmen forced
the closing of the European Commission
Technical Assistance Office in Gaza.64 Also in
Gaza, an Italian photographer was kidnapped
and later released in October 2006.65
In Southeast Asia, on 1 October 2005, three sui-
cide bombers detonated their explosives in
southern Bali killing 20 and injuring approxi-
mately 130 people. At least one UK citizen was
among the wounded. The modus operandi was
reportedly similar to the 2002 Bali bombings.
The bombing was timed to coincide with the
Australian school holidays in order to maximise
the number of tourists affected.66 The attacks
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56 Numbers from Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org; broken down: 206 Afghan civilians, 54
Afghan security personnel and 18 members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
57 For example, on 6 February 2006, a Malian national was arrested while attempting a suicide attack against the
Governor of Balkh. See: ‘The Foreign Makeup of Afghan Suicide Bombers’ (2006) Terrorism Focus, Volume III,
Issue 7.
58 ‘Italian freed after being held in Afghanistan for three weeks’, AFP, 3 November 2006; ‘Taleban blamed for
murder of Afghan aid workers’, The Guardian, 31 May 2006; ‘Journalists killed in Afghanistan’, BBC News, 10
August 2006
59 ‘Dahab Bombers Inspired by Al-Qaeda’, Asharq Al Awsat (English edition), 29 April 2006.
60 ‘Algerian Militants Post Video of December Attack’, Reuters, 21 January 2007.
61 The group planned to attack foreign targets in Morocco. Four of those arrested were women. See ‘Moroccan
Terror Plot Foiled With 56 Arrests, Officials Say’, The New York Times, 2 September 2006.
62 ‘Tunisians find explosives, embassy plans: minister’, AFP, 12 January 2007.
63 ‘Svenskar uppges dödade i Somalia’, Svenska Dagbladet, 30 January 2007.
64 ‘Gunmen in Gaza close EU office’, The Washington Times, 3 February 2006.
65 ‘Kidnapped Gaza journalist freed’, BBC News, 24 October 2006.
66 Most deaths and injuries were caused by shrapnel rather than by the blast itself. See ‘Australian police to help
probe Bali bomb’, AFP, 2 October 2005; ‘Paradise island hit again’, The Jakarta Post, 2 October 2005; and ‘A
Terrorist Strike in Bali, Choreographed for the Bombers on a Plotter’s Computer’, The New York Times, 3 July
2006.
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have been attributed to the Islamist group
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). On 16 September 2006, a
Canadian citizen was among four persons killed
in a coordinated detonation of three bombs in
Hat Yai, in southern Thailand. About 70 other
people were injured in the blasts, several of
them foreigners. The Thai authorities suspect
the involvement of a local Islamist group named
Gerakan Mujahedeen Islam Pattani.67
In October 2005, two persons were arrested in
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for preparing
a suicide terrorist attack against an undisclosed
target in Bosnia or another European country.
The aim of the attack was to force a withdrawal
of EU military forces from Iraq or Afghanistan.
The arrested were one 19 year-old Turkish citi-
zen born and raised in Denmark and one 18
year-old Swedish national of Bosnian origin.
The two had procured explosive material and
placed it in a homemade suicide belt before
their arrest. They received sentences for terror-
ist offences in a Bosnian court of 13 years and
four months and 15 years and four months in
prison, respectively.68
On 9 November 2005, a number of suicide
bombers targeted three hotels in Amman,
Jordan, known to be frequented by Western mil-
itary personnel and tourists, killing 60 and injur-
ing 115. The attacks were reportedly orchestrat-
ed by al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia.69
5.5. Islamist Terrorist Propaganda 
For more than a decade, supporters of Islamist
terror groups have published written state-
ments, articles by ideological leaders and online
magazines on the Internet, exploiting the poten-
tial for swift and anonymous communication
that this medium offers.
More recently, the use of static websites for the
propagation of Islamist terrorist propaganda
appears to be in decline: such websites are easi-
ly closed down by hackers or law-enforcement
agencies. Terrorist groups and their supporters
may find online forums that support a radical
view of Islam to be a more secure way of dis-
seminating their propaganda material. These
forums target a particular audience and offer
details of access to files stored on so-called ‘free-
storage sites’. Files containing, for instance, high-
quality full-length films may be obtained from
such sites. Since this material is spread over
numerous web servers located in different
countries, blocking access to all copies of the
files becomes virtually impossible.
Arguably, the most professional and most
productive propaganda outlet is currently the
al-Sahab Media Production Company. Al-Sahab
mainly produces video files which can take the
form of documentaries, interviews, speeches or
news programmes. Another characteristic of
al-Sahab’s products is that many of them are
accompanied by English subtitles. Where the
speaker uses English, Arabic subtitles are added.
All known speeches by members of the original
al-Qaeda leadership released after June 2006
carry the al-Sahab logo.
Other Islamist terrorist groups have their own
propaganda outlets. Iraqi and Afghan Islamist
insurgent groups publish audio and video
speeches of their leaders and videos showing
attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces under their
own labels, such as al-Furqan Media Production
Company of the Islamic State of Iraq, formerly
known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, or the Voice
of Jihad of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is often
the case that these groups attempt to emulate
the stylistic features and technical professional-
ism of al-Sahab.
From its base in Algeria, the GSPC actively tries
to compete with other Islamist terrorist propa-
ganda outlets on the Internet. In September
2006, the GSPC was publicly acknowledged by a
high-ranking al-Qaeda member as part of the
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67 ‘Four killed in Thai bomb blasts’, BBC News, 17 September 2006.
68 Sweden’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007; Denmark’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007; and Taarnby Jensen, Michael
(2006) Jihad in Denmark: An Overview and Analysis of Jihadi Activity in Denmark 1990-2006, 44-47.
69 One of the attacks involved a married couple acting as a team. A claim of responsibility by al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia, naming the attackers, was posted on the Internet on 10 November 2005. See ‘Al-Qaeda claims
Jordan attacks’, BBC News, 10 November 2005.
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organisation following a series of communi-
qués. In January 2007, the group changed its
name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
In general, 2006 saw a rise in the frequency of
statements and communiqués by Islamist
groups, especially al-Qaeda. The quality and style
of video messages and filmed attacks are more
professional and the techniques used are increas-
ingly sophisticated. English, either spoken or in
subtitles, is often the language of choice. This
may be an indication that propagandists are
attempting to reach as wide an audience as pos-
sible. The frequency and quality of such propa-
ganda, together with the possibilities for global
access, are signs of an ongoing coordinated
media offensive by Islamist terrorist groups.
5.6. Key Findings and Trends
• Failed and planned attacks by Islamist terror-
ist as reported by Member States aimed at
indiscriminate mass casualties.
• The London airplane plot and the trolley
bomb case in Germany targeted civilians
and transportation infrastructure in Member
States.
In both cases, the radicalisation process of
the suspects is reported to have been rapid.
• The explosives of choice for Islamist terror-
ists are IEDs made with home-made explo-
sives. At least two cases involved the use of
TATP, a highly volatile explosive requiring a
certain degree of expertise.
• The foiled plot in London demonstrates a
high level of sophistication in the prepara-
tion of an attack and the ability to adapt to
the latest security measures, as well as a high
degree of creativity in attempting to circum-
vent them.
• The majority of the arrested suspects were
born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and
had loose affiliations to North African ter-
rorist groups, such as the GICM and the
GSPC.
However, the suspects involved in the foiled
airplane plot in London and the Danish
Vollsmose group were born or raised in a
Member State, including converts, who had
been radicalised in Europe.
• The amount of women among those arrest-
ed suspected of Islamist terrorism was less
than among all terrorism suspects and a
large majority were EU citizens. No female
suspects were arrested for planning, prepar-
ing or executing an attack.
• Islamist terrorist networks are funded from
legal and illegal sources depending on the
individuals involved. The range of illegal
sources for Islamist terrorism funding var-
ied from vehicle-related crimes to forgery
of identity and travel documents or finan-
cial crimes, such as the use of false credit
cards.
• Volunteers are recruited in the EU to support
Islamist terrorist activities in Iraq, which has
been promoted as the key scene of global
jihad by Islamist propagandists. It seems
likely that, should other regional conflicts,
such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan,
become ‘marketed’ as global jihad, more vol-
unteers may be recruited in the EU to sup-
port them.
• The frequency of video statements by mem-
bers of the original al-Qaeda leadership and
other Islamist terrorists has shown a marked
increase. The propaganda is of greater sop-
histication, of high quality and more profes-
sional. English is used more often, either in
direct speech or in subtitles, allowing poten-
tial access to a wider audience than previous
Arabic-only publications. These facts may
point to a coordinated global media offen-
sive by Islamist terrorists.
5.
IS
LA
M
IS
T 
TE
RR
OR
IS
M
6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST 
AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM
6.1. Terrorist Attacks
In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424
attacks in the EU. The Member States most
affected were France – with 60 percent of the
attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most
part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.
Five attacks took place in the UK and one in
Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for
these attacks.
Basque separatists committed a total of 144
attacks in Spain and France. ETA claimed res-
ponsibility for 11 attacks in Spain and Irrintzi
claimed responsibility for another four in France
in 2006. Attacks in Spain were committed most-
ly by Taldes Y which refers to a number of organ-
ised and independent groups of young ETA
sympathisers who, following ETA’s instructions,
usually attack usually minor targets using urban
guerrilla techniques.
After the declaration of the ceasefire on 24
March 2006, ETA claimed responsibility for only
two attacks. However, the attack at Madrid’s
airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in two
27
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casualties and 36 people were injured. The
material damage was initially estimated to EUR
30 million.70 The van used in the Vehicle Borne
Explosive Device (VBED) was stolen in south-
western France and the owner of the van was
abducted for three days. Usually this modus
operandi typical to ETA is used for imminent
attacks and the kidnapped individuals are kept
for a couple of hours only.71 Furthermore, it was
a few days – an exceptionally long time –
before ETA officially claimed responsibility for
the attack; however, the organisation still insist-
ed on respecting the permanent ceasefire it
had unilaterally declared. Soon after the attack,
the authorities arrested suspects in France with
aggravating evidence in their possession.72
Before the ceasefire, Taldes Y carried out attacks
in 14 cities, mainly in or nearby the large north-
ern cities of Spain, such as Bilbao, Pamplona and
San Sebastián. Taldes Y temporarily stopped
fighting in April and May, but at the end of June,
they continued and accelerated their terrorist
campaign (figure 11). The campaign also wi-
dened geographically to 37 cities; attacks were
carried out in small towns.
Taldes Y mainly targeted banks and the offices of
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido
Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE).
Half of the 282 attacks carried out in Corsica
were claimed by the Front de Liberation
Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) – 22 Octobre and the
FLNC – Union Des Combattants (UDC). For half of
the attacks there was either no claim of respon-
sibility or they could not be attributed to any
group. Attacks were committed all around the
island.
Separatist terrorist violence targeted private,
business and governmental interests (figure 12).
However, in Corsica, 60 percent of separatist
attacks targeted private property, such as holi-
day apartments and houses and only 6 percent
were carried out against governmental targets.
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70 ‘ETA claims car bombing but says cease-fire stands’, Associated Press Newswires, 10 January 2006.
71 Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (GC).
72 ‘Spanish minister links arrested pair to Madrid blast’, Agence France Presse, 10 January 2007.
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Business targets of the Basque separatist groups
included automatic teller machines (ATM) and
banks.
Basque separatists also targeted critical infra-
structure, for instance by placing bombs on the
highways in Spain.73
The choice of targets by separatist terrorist
groups in the EU partially reflects extreme leftist
elements in their agenda. Yet, it is difficult to put
the high number of attacks against private
properties into perspective.
Most separatist attacks in the Basque regions
and Corsica were committed by using IEDs and
Improvised Incendiary Devices (IIDs). Taldes Y
also used Molotov cocktails during violent
demonstrations and simple IIDs against banks
and ATMs.
In Corsica, the FLNC–22 Octobre and the
FLNC–UDC only claimed responsibility for IED
and IID attacks. The FLNC-UDC also claimed
responsibility for the shooting at the Ministry of
Interior in Bastia. Almost one third of the
unclaimed attacks in Corsica consisted in da-
maging property by shooting.
In the UK, separatist groups attacked govern-
mental and business targets or rival group
members. Attacks in Northern Ireland typically
involved the use of low-level IEDs and IIDs or
firearms.
6.2. Arrested Suspects
Two hundred and twenty-six persons were
arrested in six Member States in relation to
ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in
2006 (see figure 10). Eighty-two percent of the
arrests were made in France and 12 percent in
Spain; these arrests were mainly related to
Corsican and Basque separatism.
Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg
arrested nine suspects related to the terrorist
activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
All suspects were Turkish citizens.
More than half of the arrested individuals arrest-
ed in France and Spain were suspected of
involvement in a terrorist attack or the prepara-
tion of an attack. One third of the individuals
arrested in France and Spain were suspected of
membership in a terrorist organisation. Other
suspected terrorist activities included financing
of terrorism and facilitation. Only one arrest was
related to propaganda.
Almost all separatist terrorist suspects arrested
in France and Spain were EU citizens. The per-
centage of women among separatist terrorism
suspects was about the same as among all
arrested terrorism suspects with EU citizenship.
Two thirds of the separatist terrorist suspects
arrested were aged between 26 and 50; their
average age was 38 years. Separatist terrorism
suspects in France and Spain are clearly older
than other arrested terrorism suspects in the EU,
which may indicate a longer involvement in ter-
rorist activities and a higher degree of profes-
sionalism.
6.3. Terrorist Activities
All in all, 15 suspects were arrested in relation to
financing of separatist terrorist activities. Half of
them were connected to ETA and four to
Corsican separatism. As there was no claim of
responsibility for half of the attacks against pri-
vate property in Corsica, it is possible that these
attacks may have been carried out for the extor-
tion of money which would then be used for the
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financing of terrorist activities. However, no fur-
ther data on victims was available.
In Portugal, the activity of the Galician national-
ist-separatist groups increased in 2006. In
September 2006, several incendiary devices, fly-
ers and propaganda material pertaining to
Galician pro-independence groups such as the
self-titled GZ Resistźncia Galega were recovered
at the Spanish-Portuguese border.74
Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist organ-
isations campaigning outside the EU raised
funds in the EU in 2006 for their terrorist activi-
ties (see next chapter).
In July 2006, two PKK members were arrested in
France for money laundering aimed at financing
terrorism. At the end of 2005, three members of
the PKK were arrested in Belgium and another
one in Germany suspected of financing the PKK.
In Belgium, the authorities seized receipt book-
lets indicating that the arrested suspects were
collecting ’tax’ from their fellow countrymen.
In early 2006, the UK investigated credit card
skimming case with possible links to the LTTE75.
The suspicion that this modus operandi may
have been used for the financing of the activi-
ties of the LTTE is supported by the arrest of an
LTTE member with a British passport and 28
credit cards in India on 22 January 2007.76
Furthermore, the LTTE is also known to ‘collect
donations’ from the Tamils living in the UK.77
6.4. Situation outside the EU 
A number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by
ethno-nationalist and separatist groups in
Turkey and Sri Lanka had a direct or indirect
impact on some Member States and the EU.
On 27 August 2006, five bombs exploded within
24 hours in Istanbul and the tourist destina-
tions of Marmaris and Antalya killing three
people and injuring 47. In Marmaris, ten UK
nationals were injured when an IED device
destroyed a minibus. Responsibility for the
attack was claimed by a group called Kurdistan
Freedom Falcons (Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan,
TAK); the group stated that foreigners should
stay away from tourist areas in Turkey.78 In
2005,TAK carried out a similar terrorist attack in
the seaside resort of Kusadasi, where a mini-
bus was blown up, killing and injuring British
and Irish nationals.79
On 25 June 2006, an explosion in Manavgat, east
of Antalya, killed Dutch, Hungarian, Norwegian
and Turkish tourists. No terrorist organisation
claimed responsibility for this attack.80
The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds
clearly escalated in 2006. For instance, accord-
ing to the Turkish foreign ministry, 91 Turkish
soldiers died in clashes with the PKK in the first
seven months of 2006. Turkish politicians and
generals claim that the PKK is using bases in
northern Iraq to launch attacks on Turkey. In
August 2006, a former NATO commander was
nominated by the US Department of Justice to
co-ordinate US efforts with Turkey and Iraq in
order to eliminate the terrorist threat posed by
the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in
northern Iraq and across the border to
Turkey.81
The situation in Sri Lanka deteriorated in 2006.
The organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) is suspected of the attacks in Mutur on 22
May 2006, which targeted the compounds of
three Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs),
Non-Violent Peace Force (international), ZOA
(Dutch) and Inter SOS (Italian). The attack
against Non-Violent Peace Force left three per-
sons injured.82
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75 ‘Garage scam 'funded terror group'’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 January 2007
76 ‘Tamil Tiger credit card racket spreads to Chennai’, Asian Tribune, 22 January 2007
77 ‘British Tamils are intimidated into giving money to terrorists’, The Times, 5 February 2006
78 ‘Kurdish separatists claim deadly attack on popular holiday resorts’, The Independent, 29 August 2006
79 ‘Turkish resort blast kills five’, BBC News, 16 July 2005
80 ‘Turkey “covers up terror bombings” to protect tourism‘, The Sunday Times, 2 July 2006
81 ‘Clashes with Kurds turn Turks against US’, Financial Times, 13 September 2006.
82 ‘LTTE attacks offices of INGOs’, www.nmatnet.com, 22 May 2006.
31
TE-SAT
2007
The inclusion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in the EU list of proscribed terrorist
organisations on 29 May 2006 triggered resent-
ment against the EU and its representatives in
Sri Lanka. On 8 June, the LTTE objected to the
formal engagement of EU citizens in the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) which was
established on 22 February 2002, arguing that it
was questionable whether they would be suffi-
ciently impartial to be able to adjudicate critical
matters on the ground. Thirty-nine observers to
the SLMM from Sweden, Finland and Denmark
had to leave Sri Lanka by 1 September 2006.83
Seventeen local employees of the French NGO
Action Contre la Faim working on a project for
survivors of the 2004 tsunami were murdered in
Mutur on 4 August 2006. The LTTE was suspect-
ed of the attack but has denied its involvement.84
6.5. Key Findings and Trends
• The attack at Madrid’s airport resulted in loss
of life and injuries. ETA has not only main-
tained but rebuilt its capabilities to strike
with well-prepared, organised and coordi-
nated attacks against high-profile targets.
Three months after the unilateral ceasefire,
ETA started to use Taldes Y to carry out a high
number of low intensity attacks to maintain
pressure on the Spanish government and to
demonstrate to its supporters its determina-
tion to fight for its goals.
The threat posed by ETA to Spain depends also
on its capability to control its own members.
• Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a
high number of low intensity attacks result-
ing mainly in limited material damage. More
than half of the attacks targeted private
property. Only six percent of the attacks
were committed against governmental tar-
gets. Although Corsican separatists have not
directly tried to kill people, the volume of
attacks may increase the risk of casualties.
• Dissident Irish republican terrorist groups
continue to engage in acts of terrorism in
Northern Ireland involving the use of low-
level improvised explosive and incendiary
devices against a variety of military or busi-
ness targets.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
remains committed to the political process.
• Separatist terrorism suspects in France and
Spain are clearly older than other terrorism
suspects arrested in the EU, which may indi-
cate a longer involvement in terrorist activi-
ties and a higher degree of professionalism.
• The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in
the EU is related to the escalation of the ter-
rorist campaign of Kurdish terrorists in
Turkey.
• In 2006, the security situation in Sri Lanka
deteriorated with the resumption of violence
between governmental forces and the LTTE,
with the potential to affect EU interests in the
region. This could also result in an increase in
illegal fund raising activities within the EU.
6.
ET
HN
O-
NA
TI
ON
AL
IS
T 
 A
ND
 S
EP
AR
AT
IS
T 
TE
RR
OR
IS
M
83 See the Press Release of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 August 2006.
84 ‘Politicization of Aid in Sri Lanka Turns Deadly’, www.worldwatch.org, 28 August 2006.
7. LEFT-WING AND 
ANARCHIST TERRORISM
7.1. Terrorist Attacks  
In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried
out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns main-
ly targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany
(figure 13).
A variety of traditional left-wing, anarchist and
other anti-establishment groups were active in
Greece. Half of the 25 attacks carried out were
claimed by groups such as Revolutionary
Struggle, Revolutionary Brigade, Revolutionary
Liberating Action, and Anti-Fascist Action.
Anarchist groups, under occasional names such
as Comrades Group and Revolutionary Solidarity
Cells, accelerated their campaigns particularly
towards the end of the year in order to demon-
strate solidarity to their imprisoned comrades.85
Their activity centred mainly on Athens and, to a
smaller extent, Thessalonica. The agenda of the
Greek left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups is
driven mainly by domestic politics and social
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FIGURE 13: Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorist Attacks and Arrests in 2006 
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issues; however, the attack of 26 February 2006,
for instance, was called an act of solidarity to the
imprisoned members of the French organisa-
tion Action Directe.
Italy reported an increase in attacks by left-wing
and anarchist terrorist groups. The organisation
Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito
Communista Combattente (BR-PCC) claimed
responsibility for one attack and the organisa-
tion Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI) and
other anarchist groups were held responsible
for nine attacks in Rome, major cities in the
north of the country and Tuscany.
In Spain, six attacks were carried out by the First
of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
in Madrid and Barcelona. Two attacks went un-
claimed. The level of activity of anarchist terror-
ist groups in Spain remained low in 2006.
In Germany, the organisations Militante Gruppe
and Working group on Colonialism and War in the
Militant Anti-G8 Campaign claimed responsibili-
ty for ten low-impact attacks resulting in limited
material damage in 2006.
In France, the Turkish group Turkiye Kommunist
Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (TKP/ML) was suspected
of an arson attack against the Turkish consulate
in Paris on 17 June 2006.86
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups at-
tacked campaigned mainly governmental and
business targets (figure 14). There were no dif-
ferences between Member States in this
respect. In Greece, for instance, diplomatic tar-
gets, police forces, vehicles, politicians’ offices
and banks, as well as CCTV traffic cameras were
attacked.
On 18 October 2006, in Italy, an attack targeted
a company dealing with electronic components
for weapon systems. Responsibility for this ac-
tion was claimed in a flyer signed by the organi-
sation Fronte Rivoluzionario.87
Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups relied
on similar tactics in all targeted Member States.
Most terrorist attacks (92 percent) were carried
out using various IEDs ranging from small letter
bombs targeting individuals to larger scale
devices with the aim to damage or destroy
structures and property. A list of the most seri-
ous attacks reads as follows:
• The group Revolutionary Struggle claimed
responsibility for a powerful  bomb attack on
the Greek Culture Minister on 30 May 2006.
It stated that its aim had been to assasinate
the Minister.88
• On 2 June 2006, an anarchist terrorist group
called Rivolta Anonima Tremenda claimed
responsibility for a double attack against a
police station in the town of Fossano in Italy.
The first explosive device was set off to at-
tract attention. Subsequently, another larger
device was set off targeting the police arriv-
ing at the crime scene.
Arson – intentionally setting fire to cause injury
or damage – was also used by many left-wing
and anarchist terrorist groups.
The majority of the IEDs and Molotov cocktails
were constructed from simple, easily available
ingredients, such as butane gas cylinders and
flammable materials, the use of which does not
require special knowledge, organisation or infra-
structure.
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7.2. Arrested Suspects
Fifty-two individuals suspected of left-wing and
anarchist terrorist activities were arrested in five
Member States in 2006. Almost half of them
were arrested in Italy. Five (of the 52) were sus-
pected of involvement in a terrorist attack or the
preparation of an attack. Most arrested individ-
uals were suspected of memberhip of a terrorist
organisation.
Spain arrested six GRAPO members. One mem-
ber of GRAPO and his partner were arrested in
Paris on 17 October 2005, after a joint investiga-
tion conducted by the Spanish and French
authorities.
Two  thirds of the arrested suspects in Italy and
Spain were aged between 27 and 43 and were
EU citizens. One third of the arrested suspects
were women, which is a much higher percent-
age than among all terrorism suspects arrested
in the EU.
In France, 15 people were arrested as a result of
the dismantling of the French branch of the
Turkish TKP/ML while Germany and Belgium
arrested a total of six members of the DHKP/C.
Eighteen out of the 21 Turkish suspects were
male and aged between 26 and 52.
7.3. Terrorist Activities
Left-wing terrorist groups finance their activities
through common violent crime such as extor-
tion, bank robberies and kidnapping. For instan-
ce, on 6 February 2006, GRAPO carried out an
armed attack that caused the death of a busi-
ness woman and left her husband seriously
injured.
GRAPO also carried out an armed bank robbery
and a theft in Spain. 89
The dismantling of the French branch of
TKP/ML revealed that the organisation financed
its terrorist activities in Turkey through criminal
activities such as kidnapping, extortion and
money laundering.
7.4. Key Findings and Trends
• Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out
a relatively high number of low intensity
attacks against business and government
targets which resulted in limited material
damage. A minority of the attacks, however,
were intended to kill or injure.
• Left-wing and anarchist terrorists prefer to
use Molotov cocktails and IEDs made of
ingredients which are easily available. Their
tactics of choice are unsophisticated and do
not require a high level of training, expertise
or preparation.
• A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist
groups are active mainly in Germany, Greece,
Italy and Spain.
• In Greece, the number of terrorist attacks
rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.
• Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are
motivated by domestic politics but they are
also perpetrated as a part of wider interna-
tional campaigns; for instance, the G8
Summit has already been targeted of left-
wing and anarchist terrorists.
• All arrested suspects in Italy and Spain were
EU citizens. The percentage of women was
much higher than among all arrested terror-
ism suspects in the EU.
• Although the terrorist attacks committed by
left-wing terrorists resulted in limited materi-
al damage, left-wing terrorist groups finance
their activities by violent means such as
extortion, bank robbery and kidnapping.
This indicates the existing potential for vio-
lence.
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8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM
Right-wing extremist violence is a serious,
increasing problem in a number of Member
States. However, reporting on right-wing terror-
ism is random as right-wing violence and other
politically motivated crimes are mainly investi-
gated as right-wing extremism and not as ter-
rorist offences.
Only one right-wing terrorist attack was report-
ed in 2006. In May 2006, two skinheads stabbed
a member of Antify (Anty Nazi Front) in Warsaw.
The personal data and the address of the victim
were disseminated on the Internet by Blood and
Honour, a neo-Nazi organisation active in a num-
ber of Member States.90
Altogether, fifteen terrorism suspects (N=550)
arrested in 2006 were related to right-wing ter-
rorism. Terrorist activities investigated included
preparation of an attack, membership of a ter-
rorist organisation and dissemination of propa-
ganda.
In September 2006, 11 men and one woman – all
members of Blood, Soil and Honour, which is a
dissident fraction of Blood and Honour – were
arrested in Belgium. Nine of them were suspect-
ed of plotting terrorist attacks and three were
suspected of arms trafficking. One of them was
also suspected of financing terrorist organisa-
tions via illegal arms trafficking.91
The Polish police started an investigation into
the dissemination of propaganda on the
Internet by Blood and Honour in February 2006.
The website disseminated a variety of typical
right-wing extremist propaganda in Polish.
Another website provided contact details of
identified targets for possible extremist and ter-
rorist attacks. The server was located in the US,
but the website was updated in Poland. The
server and the website were closed in coopera-
tion between the Polish authorities and the
FBI.92
Right-wing extremists also attack their political
opponents on the Internet. For instance, on 5
October 2005, German right-wing extremists
hacked a left-wing extremist mail-order site and
published customers’ personal data on the
Internet. The attack came after left-wing extre-
mists hacked into right-wing extremist discus-
sion forums. 93
Key Findings 
• Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as
right-wing extremism and not as right-wing
terrorism.
• The amount of right-wing extremist violence
against people is alarming and poses a seri-
ous threat. Although violent acts perpetrat-
ed by right-wing extremist may appear
mainly sporadic and situational, right-wing
extremist activities are organised and trans-
national.
• Right-wing violence is partly driven by the
agenda of their perceived opponents.
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91 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (Monthly Overview Terrorism, September 2006).
92 Poland’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
93 Annual Report of the Protection of the Constitution 2005. Federal Ministry of the Interior.
9. CONTEXT OF TERRORISM IN THE EU
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in
Europe. It has changed over time as have its
causes and outward manifestations. The con-
text of terrorism in the EU is set primarily by
each Member States’ own historical, political,
economical and social circumstances. How-
ever, the EU as a political institution is increas-
ingly being identified as a symbol and has
already become threatened and targeted by
terrorists.
The phenomenon of terrorism in the EU cannot
be put into perspective without taking into
account the international security environ-
ment, especially in the case of Islamist terror-
ism. Terrorist organisations campaigning in
Third States use the EU as their logistical basis
and for funding. Furthermore, regionally limit-
ed terrorist phenomena outside the EU may
‘spill over’ and impact on Member States; for
instance, terrorists may target EU tourists to
attract attention from the international com-
munity to their cause. Terrorism is also increas-
ingly characterised by externality: actions
taken by one country have consequences –
cost or benefits – on other countries. For
instance, protective measures taken by one
country may divert a terrorist attack in another
country.94
Not very surprisingly,in the age of globalisation ter-
rorists and extremists also seek to ‘go global’ and
portray their terrorist activities as having a global
reach and impact, even as representing a world-
wide movement. Since the end of the 1990s, the
Internet has enabled the rapid, pervasive and inex-
pensive exchange and dissemination of informa-
tion worldwide. This has empowered terrorist
organisations with the ability to shape and dissem-
inate their message in their own way. The Internet
is used by terrorists in various ways for both internal
and external communication. Virtually all types of
terrorist groups have gone online.
Terrorism in the EU is essentially a transnational
phenomenon. In order to counter terrorism
effectively, law enforcement needs to share infor-
mation, cooperate closely and coordinate its
efforts at European level. Law enforcement does
not just investigate terrorist attacks in the EU, but
also prevents terrorist campaigns outside the EU
by, for instance, disrupting recruitment and fund-
ing of terrorist networks in Europe. Therefore, it is
important to have a common tool like the TE-SAT
2007 providing an overview of the situation
regarding the phenomenon of terrorism in the
EU; with this tool Europol can provide added
value and support to the Member States in their
fight against terrorism.
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BR-PCC Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Communista Combattente
New Red Brigades, Communist Combatant Party
DHKP/C Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
FAI Federazione Anarchia Informale
Informal Anarchist Federation
FLNC-22 Octobre Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse 22 Octobre
FLNC-UDC Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants
GIMC Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GRAPO Grupo de Restistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group
GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat
GZ Resistźncia Galega
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IID Improvised Incendiary Devices
IRA Oglaigh na hEireann 
Irish Republican Army
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party
aka Kongra Gel aka Kadek
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
TAK Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan 
Kurdistan Freedom Falcons 
Taldes Y “Groups Y”
TATP Triacetone Triperoxide
TKP/ML Turkiye Kommunist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist
Turkish Communist Party /Marxist-Leninist
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
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According to Article 1 of the Council Frame-
work Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating
Terrorism (2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are
intentional acts which, given their nature or
context, may seriously damage a country or an
international organisation where committed.
Terrorist offences are committed with the aim
of
• seriously intimidating a population, or 
• unduly compelling a Government or interna-
tional organisation to perform or abstain
from performing an act, or 
• seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-
damental political, constitutional, economic
or social structures of a country or an inter-
national organisation.
Terrorist offences include
1. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause
death;
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
4. causing extensive destruction to a Govern-
ment or a public facility, a transport system,
an infrastructure facility, including an infor-
mation system, a fixed platform located on
the continental shelf, a public place or pri-
vate property likely to endanger human life
or result in major economic loss;
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of
public or goods transport;
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, trans-
port, supply or use of weapons, explosives or
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons,
as well as research into and development of
biological and chemical weapons;
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing
fires, floods or explosions the effect of which
is to endanger human life;
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of
water, power or any other fundamental natu-
ral resource the effect of which is to endan-
ger human life;
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed
above.
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States
to take the necessary measures to ensure that
directing a terrorist group, participating in its
activities including supplying of information
or material resources, or by funding its activi-
ties are punishable.
Article 3 obliges Member States to take the neces-
sary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offen-
ces include aggravated theft, extortion and
drawing up false administrative documents
with a view to commit certain terrorist offences.
According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or
abetting offences referred to in the Framework
Decision should also be made punishable.
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ANNEX 3 
Implementation of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in Member
States which Provided Eurojust with Information on Convictions
Country Details 
Belgium
Implementation by 8 January 2004 to include the definition of terrorist offences, new
investigative powers have been introduced by law of 27 December 2005, which entered
into force on 30 December 2005.
France
The Counterterrorism Act of 1986 defines terrorism and the elements of this crime are
defined in the penal code. Existing laws were updated by law (24 January 2006): an act
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence can be punished up to 30 years
and a penalty of € 500,000 can be imposed. New investigative powers are now also
allowed.
Germany
On 28 December 2003, Sections 129a and 129b of the Criminal Code were updated to
implement the 2002 Council Decision.
Italy
Terrorism is defined under section 270 of the Criminal Code which dates back to 1980.
An amendment in 2001 extended the definition of terrorism to include violence against
international organisations. On 31 July 2005, a new definition was adopted reflecting
elements of the Framework Decision. Law 29 of 25 January 2006 implements the direc-
tive of terrorism financing.
The Netherlands
Recruitment for the jihad and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence were criminalised
on 10 August 2004. Maximum penalties were increased (on average by some 50%) if
committed with terrorist intent. A penalty of 15 years was increased to life or 20 years
for actions committed with terrorist intent and from 1 year to 4 years for conspiracy to
commit a terrorist offence. New investigative powers are in place as of 1 January 2006.
Spain
Existing laws were updated on 21 May 2003, where new provisions were introduced
regarding the financing of terrorism.
Sweden
A new Swedish law of 1 July 2003 provides for higher penalties when an action is com-
mitted with a terrorist intent, up to a life sentence.
United Kingdom
Terrorism was already defined with the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act and further
extended with the Terrorism Act of 2000 to include actions that can have very serious
consequences for public security. The Crime (International Co-operation) Act of 2003
implements the Framework Decision with regard to extra-territorial jurisdiction over a
range of terrorist offences. On 30 March 2006, a new Terrorism Act 2006 was adopted.
TE-SAT
2007

EUROPOL
